Extended Edition: Success of the Schlieffen Plan

Alfred von Schlieffen...

You can bet that his name will be mentioned when you read or watch something about World War I. And for good reason. In my two-part blog series, I covered his famous plan in quite a bit of detail and what it could’ve meant if it had been successful. But for this extended edition, I want to focus on the man—who he was, where he came from, and how he ended up in the German military. 

On 28 February 1833, Alfred von Schlieffen was born in Berlin, the capital of Prussia. His family comes from an ancient Pomeranian noble line of the region now split between modern-day Poland and Germany on the Baltic Sea. Alfred was educated in the spirit of the Priests, a branch of Lutheranism, who focus on four key things: 

• To be a people of the heart for whom Christian living is a fundamental concern

• To be a people of one book who take their standards and goals from pages of Scripture

• To be a people who are serious about holy living and make every effort to follow God’s Law, spread the gospel, and aid the needy. 

• Oppose the coldness and sterility in established church forms and practices.

It would seem no surprise that he was born into a military family. His father was Major Magnus von Schlieffen, a Prussian Army officer whose brother was a Lieutenant Colonel and a royal aide-de-camp. 

German field marshal Alfred von Schlieffen in 1906.

Alfred was one of seven children (four boys and three girls). His older brother, Theodor Graf von Schlieffen, would also follow in their father’s footsteps, joining the military in 1852 and seeing action in the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars. Alfred did not initially join the military, showing no interest while attending the University of Berlin as a law student. 

At the time, the Kingdom of Prussia had compulsory military service, so Alfred enlisted sometime between 1853 and 1854. He would not transfer into the reserve force but was selected as an officer candidate. He attended the German War School from 1858 to 1861. He then served as a General Staff officer from 1863, in various roles, including the Topographic Department of the General Staff until 1866. For two years, he served under the

Prussian military attache in Paris. In 1868, he married his cousin, Countess Anna Schlieffen, and had two girls together. After the second child, his wife passed, and all his focus shifted to military affairs. 

Rising to Chief of the General Staff 

The year is 1866, and Schlieffen finds himself in his first war. Known as the Austro-Prussian War, it lasted from 14 June to 22 July. He served as a staff officer in the Prussian cavalry corps in the decisive Battle of Königgrätz. He witnessed firsthand many key lessons, particularly a war of two fronts. In allying with Italy, Otto von Bismarck forced Austria to send part of its army south. Combined with greater mobility thanks to railways, better tactics, and a new weapon, the Dreyse needle-gun, the first bolt-action rifle ever invented, the Prussians won the battle and would eventually win the war (railways and splitting an army into two fronts would play a major role in shaping the Schlieffen plan). 

War would come again, and out of it, Schlieffen saw the rise of the German Empire. During the Franco-Prussian War, he served on the staff of the XIII Army Corps of Friedrich II of Mecklenburg-Schwerin. During his time in France, he was promoted to the rank of Major. From 1876 to 1884, he was commander of the first regiment of the Garde-Ulanen. In 1889, he finally rose to the role of department head in the Great General Staff and was promoted to quartermaster general. In 1891, Count Alfred von Waldersee retired from the position of Chief of the General Staff, a role that Schlieffen would hold until 1905. It was late in his career that his plan, now known as The Schlieffen Plan, was drafted in response to Russia's failure in the Russo-Japanese War. 

The Man and His Legacy 

Schlieffen was regarded as withdrawn, taciturn,

and rather cold. One would imagine the death of his wife might have something to do with that. However, he was also known to be very dutiful, determined, and knowledgeable. And given the premise of his war plan, he had a keen sense of what lay ahead for the empire in its future wars on the continent. 

After seeing the failure of the Russian Army, he believed that Russia would never be able to mobilize faster enough if war came to the empire on two fronts with France. He believed the French were the greater threat and thus planned for the empire’s armies to quickly outflank and destroy the French before turning to face the Russians in the east.     

While it received amendments in the years leading up to 1914, the basic premise did not change. Defeat France first and quickly before turning to face the Russians. 

In a memorandum released in 1911, the then Chief of Staff, General Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, successor to Schlieffen, had this to say about the since amended plan: 

Chief of Staff General Helmuth von Moltke the Younger. After the German army's failure, he was replaced on September 14, 1914, by Erich von Falkenhayn. His amendments to the Schlieffen Plan have been debated for decades. Some have argued that those changes were what caused it to fail, particularly the weakening of the forces on the right flank.

"It may be safely assumed that the next war will be a war on two fronts. Of our enemies, France is the most dangerous and can prepare the most quickly. Accounts must be settled with her very soon after deployment. Should the defeat of the French be achieved quickly and decisively, it will also be possible to make forces available against Russia.

I agree with the basic idea of opening the war with a strong offensive against France while initially remaining on the defensive with weak forces against Russia. If a quick decision is sought against France, the attack should not be directed exclusively against the strongly fortified eastern front of that country. If, as may be expected, the French army remains on the defensive behind that front, there is no chance of quickly breaking through; and even a breakthrough would expose the German army, or those sections which have made it, to flank attack from two sides.

If one wants to meet the enemy in the open, the fortified frontier line must be outflanked. This is only possible by means of an advance through Switzerland or Belgium. The first would encounter great difficulties and, because of the defence of the mountain roads, would take a long time. On the other hand, a successful outflanking of the French fortifications would have the advantage of forcing the French army towards the north. An advance through Belgium would force the French back into their interior. Nevertheless, it should be preferred, because there one can count on quicker progress. We can count on the somewhat inefficient Belgian forces being quickly scattered, unless the Belgian army should withdraw without a battle to Antwerp, which would then have to be sealed off. 

It is important, of course, that for an advance through Belgium the right wing should be made as strong as possible. But I cannot agree that the envelopment demands the violation of Dutch neutrality in addition to Belgian. A hostile Holland at our back could have disastrous consequences for the advance of the German army to the west, particularly if England should use the violation of Belgian neutrality as a pretext for entering the war against us. A neutral Holland secures our rear, because if England declares war on us for violating Belgian neutrality, she cannot herself violate Dutch neutrality. She cannot break the very law for whose sake she goes to war.

Furthermore, it will be very important to have in Holland a country whose neutrality allows us to have imports and supplies. She must be the windpipe that enables us to breathe. However awkward it may be, the advance through Belgium must therefore take place without the violation of Dutch territory. This will hardly be possible unless Liège is in our hands. The fortress must therefore be taken at once. I think it possible to take it by a coup de main. Its salient forts are so unfavourably sited that they do not overlook the intervening country and cannot dominate it. I have had a reconnaissance made of all roads running through them into the centre of the town, which has no ramparts. An advance with several columns is possible without their being observed from the forts. Once our troops have entered the town, I believe that the forts will not bombard it but will probably capitulate.

Everything depends on meticulous preparation and surprise. The enterprise is only possible if the attack is made at once, before the areas between the forts are fortified. It must therefore be undertaken by standing troops immediately war is declared."

The conclusions made in this quotation proved consequential only a few years later. As I detailed in the original two-part blog series, I highlighted the shortfalls of Moltke’s adjustments to Schlieffen’s original plan (which contributed to its failure). But Schlieffen would never see his plan implemented, dying on 4 January 1913, just 19 months before the start of the bloodiest war the world had ever seen.

Read Original Blog (Part 1)

Read Original Blog Post (Part 2) 

SOurces

1. Wikipedia contributors. (2026, January 11). Alfred von Schlieffen. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved January 12, 2026, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_von_Schlieffen

2. Stein, O. (2017, February 21). Schlieffen, Alfred, Graf von. 1914-1918 Online International Encyclopedia. Retrieved January 12, 2026, from https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/schlieffen-alfred-graf-von-1-1/

3. Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). Schlieffen. In Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia. Retrieved January 12, 2026, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schlieffen

4. Author unknown. (n.d.). What is Pietism? Modern Reformation. Retrieved January 12, 2026, from https://www.modernreformation.org/resources/articles/what-is-pietism

5. Mohr, R. (n.d.). Theodor Graf von Schlieffen. The Prussian Machine. Retrieved January 12, 2026, from https://prussianmachine.com/prussia/schlieffen_theo.htm

6. Mohr, R. (n.d.). Alfred Graf von Schlieffen. The Prussian Machine. Retrieved January 12, 2026, from https://prussianmachine.com/prussia/schlieffen.htm

7. Britannica Editors. (n.d.). Seven Weeks’ War. Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved January 12, 2026, from https://www.britannica.com/event/Seven-Weeks-War

8. von Moltke, H. (1911). General von Moltke on the Schlieffen Plan (1911). Alpha History. Retrieved January 12, 2026, from https://alphahistory.com/worldwar1/von-moltke-schlieffen-plan-1911/

Images

1. Unknown author. (1914). Bataille-frontières-allemands-.jpg [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. Retrieved January 12, 2026, from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bataille-frontieres-allemands-.jpg 

2. Musvage. (2019, January 24). Alfred von Schlieffen.png [Image]. Wikimedia Commons. Retrieved January 12, 2026, from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Alfred_von_Schlieffen.png 

3. Erik del Toro Streb. (2015, June 27). Schlieffen_Plan_fr_1905.svg [SVG map]. Wikimedia Commons. Retrieved January 12, 2026, from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Schlieffen_Plan_fr_1905.svg 

4. Unknown author. (1916). Helmuth_von_Moltke.png [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. Retrieved January 12, 2026, from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Helmuth_von_Moltke.png