Extended Edition: The USS Nautilus Misses Its Moment at Midway

It’s 4 June, 1942. Just after 10:20 in the morning, two American squadrons began their attack on the Japanese aircraft carriers Akagi and Kaga. The Americans had found the carriers because of a key decision made by one of the squadron leaders, Air Group Commander C. Wade McClusky, Jr., who followed a lone Japanese destroyer. It was off-station because it chased and suppressed the American submarine USS Nautilus. 

Suppose the USS Nautilus had not been in the right position or had it been destroyed or damaged earlier in the morning, as I detailed in the original blog. In that case, McClusky might have had his own flight to nowhere (the USS Hornet’s fighter and bomber squadrons failed to find the Japanese fleet that morning, hence the name ‘the flight to nowhere’). VB-6 was dangerously running low on fuel. Most likely, he would not risked his entire flight and would have turned back to the carriers. 

Yet, VB-3 found the Japanese carrier force on its own. So, at the very least, Soryu would’ve still been hit. If the flight had split like McClusky’s flight did when they attacked, maybe VB-3 would’ve hit two Japanese carriers. The hit ratio at this point in the war was 1 in 6. In theory, 14 dive bombers in VB-3 could’ve landed one hit each on two Japanese carriers. 

Therefore, without McClusky’s attack, the Japanese might have had at least one or two carriers burning anyway. But that means the Japanese would still have two to three carriers to launch their counter-strike, which they were trying to get airborne when VB-6 and VB-3.

U.S. Navy Douglas SBD-3 "Dauntless" dive bombers from scouting squadron VS-8 from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet (CV-8) approaching the burning Japanese heavy cruiser Mikuma to make the third set of attacks on her, during the Battle of Midway, 6 June 1942.

showed up (this is what contributed to the large explosions on the Japanese carriers as Admiral Nagumo made the fateful decision to rearm his planes with torpedoes rather than bombs once the American carriers were spotted).

So what are we looking at? USS Yorktown was hit by three bombs and two torpedoes just from two flight groups from Hiryu. Those flight vectors were based on the last report they received. If they had one or two more carrier flight groups with torpedo and dive bomber compositions, it’s not a stretch to say that at least one more American carrier might have been hit. 

In either scenario, without USS Nautilus and Wade McKlusky’s critical decision, we are looking at a couple of situations:

With Situation 1, I don’t think anything changes with the Pacific War. 

In Situation 2, depending on how bad the loss is, it may cause Nimitz to get fired. Admiral King would probably weather this loss. If the Americans were able to salvage some of the carrier force, Nimitz might escape being fired as well. This would leave the US Navy licking its wounds and remaining on the defensive. 

With the loss of Yorktown and another hit on one or both of the other two carriers, Nimitz would have to lean back on his submarine force. He may even pull some of the carriers that were part of the invasion force during Operation Torch into the Pacific to fill the gap. These include the USS Ranger and the escort carriers USS Santee, USS Suwanee, USS Sangamon, and USS Chenango. He would also have USS Saratoga back in the lineup since she missed Midway by only five days. 

As for Situation 3, Nimitz would not survive and would be fired.

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt hand-picked Nimitz because he was very familiar with the up-and-coming Navy officers. There was a 28-admiral shortlist for the role, yet Nimitz was missing from that list. If he were somehow fired, I don’t think this list would’ve been revisited. I think there are three likely candidates to replace Nimitz in this scenario. 

The U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS Ranger (CV-4) at sea during the late 1930s.

Pick 1: Admiral Raymond A. Spruance

Assuming he had survived the battle of Midway physically and politically, Spruance could be a possible option. He could think strategically and had a great knack for sniffing out danger (he chose not to push west to uncover the Japanese surface force. They might have run right into what the Japanese wanted, a surface fight, snatching defeat from victory. After Midway, Spruance became Nimitz’s deputy. I don’t have any doubts he would’ve done well in this role as Nimitz did in our timeline, except for one issue I’ll raise later (hint, it deals with Operation Flintlock). 

Pick 2: Admiral Charles A. Lockwood

Taking over for Rear Admiral Robert Henry English, who died in a plane crash, Lockwood became Commander, Submarines, Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC). He led the silent service for the remainder of the war and was instrumental in solving the US torpedo problem. However, given the timing of Midway, he would’ve just taken the position of Commander, Submarines, South West Pacific, and acted as Commander of Allied Naval Forces, Western Australia, under General Douglas MacArthur. This would not be a surprising selection either. He would’ve been positioned in the area where the next Japanese naval and land offensive in the Pacific after a Midway draw or defeat (the second Coral Sea to take Port Moresby).

Pick 3: Admiral William Frederick "Bull" Halsey Jr

Due to a bad case of dermatitis, Halsey was sidelined for Midway. He chose Spruance to go in his stead, which would prove quite consequential. If Halsey had been at Midway, his aggressive nature might have been a detriment rather than a benefit, pushing the battle further where Spruance decided to hold back. With a draw or defeat at Midway and Halsey’s absence from a supposed disaster, it would be an interesting choice to take Nimitz’s place. While it’s questionable how Halsey would have done at such a high, strategic level, he was one of the few men who could get along and work with MacArthur. That could prove beneficial to the war in the long run. 

Admiral King was well-favored by FDR. I am not convinced he would’ve been sacked after a loss at Midway. A loss at Midway might have further strengthened King’s position that Japan, not Germany, should be the main focus (running counter to FDR's policy). No doubt he would’ve leveraged the situation to obtain more resources. 

However, FDR might still keep the focus on Germany, leaving the US on the defensive in the Pacific. The forces used for Operation Watchtower might be drawn from King, since the US would not want to launch an offensive in the Pacific after a loss at Midway. But at the same time, King might find some way to use it just so that he doesn’t lose those resources. He was already trying to fight for more, and having those resources taken away would’ve been the last thing he would want to happen.

There are two areas where these resources could be applied. One would be forced by the Japanese, and the other would be a possible US offensive. I’ll start with the latter, given that it feels the least probable. The US would probably stay on the defensive until it could do more damage to the Japanese carrier fleet and/or replenish it with the new classes of ships being built in the US, which wouldn’t be ready until 1943. 

One possible place King could’ve applied his resources was in the Aleutians. While these Alaskan islands held little strategic significance for the Japanese (given how far away they were from everything and the poor weather in this region), they sparked a political firestorm in the United States. 

To keep his resources and deter the political pressure from the public’s fear about the Japanese being so close to the homeland, I could see a potential acceleration of the Aleutian Campaign. Such an operation might prompt a Japanese response that could trigger a larger naval engagement in the area, expanding the scope of the original Battle of the Komandorski Islands. 

U.S. soldiers of the southern landing force on the beach at Massacre Bay, Attu Island, Alaska (USA), during the Battle of Attu, 11 May 1943. The landing craft in the foreground belongs to the attack transport USS Heywood (APA-6).

However, I think the next engagement we would see after Midway would be a second “Coral Sea” naval battle. The Japanese were focused on New Guinea and taking Port Moresby more than Guadalcanal until the United States forced them to divert forces to the Solomons. After a Midway victory, the Japanese would renew their effort to sever the supply lines to Australia. If there was any place the United States would hold the line fervently, it would be there.

Again, the Americans would most likely be outnumbered in carriers, mustering USS Saratoga, USS Wasp, and possibly one of the carriers from Midway if any had survived  (USS Enterprise or Hornet most likely). Who knows how that would’ve turned out? 

Now, I want to touch on Midway itself, for the Japanese did plan to invade the atoll. Based on what they were facing, the assault would’ve been very challenging for the Japanese. The Marines were armed to the teeth and outnumbered the Japanese landing force 2-to-1. The Japanese landing craft would’ve struggled to cross the reefs, leading to their own version of Tarawa. Lacking an efficient system to call in fire support from naval gunfire, the initial invasion most likely would‘ve been repelled. 

If the Japanese assault failed, would the Japanese try to muster more resources to make a second assault, like they did at Wake Island? If so, this might’ve led to another naval engagement around Midway unless the Japanese decided to focus instead on New Guinea. But it’s hard to say if such a defeat would force them to walk away or if honor would dictate that they try again. However, even with the loss of Midway itself, the island would’ve been hard for the Japanese to keep in supply and would be in range of US aircraft from Hawaii. In the long run, it would not be worth it, but then again, the Japanese took the Aleutians. 

U.S. Marines wade ashore on Tarawa. The Japanese landing craft slated for Midway would not have cleared the reef, similar to what happened to the Marines, leading to their own version of Bloody Betio.

Lastly, as I alluded to earlier, if the US lost catastrophically at Midway and Spruance was tapped to replace Nimitz, there’s no doubt that the way the US planned to carry out the war would not change. The way the US would fight the Japanese was laid out in War Plan Orange many years before (although with some slight changes). So, the island-hopping campaign, specifically the Central Pacific Drive, would still occur. The difference would be the timing.

A loss at Midway would push the timeline back by at least six months, if not more. But as the US clawed its way toward the Mariana Islands, the US Marines might have had another bloodbath on their hands coming on the heels of Betio (Tarawa). 

In the invasion of the Marshall Islands, Nimitz wanted to bypass the outer, more heavily defended atolls in favor of Eniwetok, Majuro, and Kwajalein. Kelly Turner, Holland Smith, and Ray Spruance disagreed and preferred to attack the outer perimeter first, including Wotje, Maloelap, and Mili. Had Spruance been in charge, the US might have taken these places first, extending the Marshall Islands campaign and the cost of taking them, further pushing back the war's timeline. Thankfully, that never happened. 

U.S. Marines clearing a Japanese bunker on Kwajalein Atoll during Operation Flintlock launched on 31 January, 1944.

As we’ve explored, the American victory at Midway set up the entire trajectory of the Pacific Campaign. Without the victory at Midway, we wouldn’t have had the latitude to invade Guadalcanal (at least as early as we did), which effectively seized the initiative from the Japanese. Our presence influenced every naval battle from that point forward in the Solomons. Changing the outcome of Midway changes many things, but the one thing it would not change is the war's outcome. It would simply be a matter of when rather than if the Japanese would be defeated. They simply could not compete with the economic might of the US in an attritional war they had found themselves in.

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Sources

1. Naval History and Heritage Command. (n.d.). Battle of Midway, 3–6 June 1942: Combat narrative. U.S. Navy. https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/b/battle-of-midway-3-6-june-1942-combat-narrative.html

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3. Paridon, S., Toti, W. (2022, October 22). Calculated risk—Prepping for Midway, with special guest John Parshall (No. 1.08) [Audio podcast episode]. In The Unauthorized History of the Pacific War. https://youtu.be/eCvI_OCIbQ4?si=xBlJ1uOY1n566CoH

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6. Wikipedia contributors. (n.d.). USS Nautilus (SS-168). In Wikipedia. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Nautilus_(SS-168)

Images

1. Wikimedia Commons contributors. (n.d.). Admiral William Frederick Halsey by Harry Warnecke and Robert F. Cranston, 1945, color carbro print, from the National Portrait Gallery - NPG-9500834C_1 [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Admiral_William_Frederick_Halsey_by_Harry_Warnecke_and_Robert_F._Cranston,_1945,_color_carbro_print,_from_the_National_Portrait_Gallery_-_NPG-9500834C_1.jpg

2. Wikimedia Commons contributors. (n.d.). Aerial view of Midway Atoll on 24 November 1941 (80-G-451086) [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Aerial_view_of_Midway_Atoll_on_24_November_1941_(80-G-451086).jpg

3. Wikimedia Commons contributors. (n.d.). Attu landing craft on beach, 1943 [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Attu_landing_craft_on_beach_1943.jpg

4. Wikimedia Commons contributors. (n.d.). Kwajalein-closing in [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kwajalein-closing_in.jpeg

5. Wikimedia Commons contributors. (n.d.). Marines Wade Ashore, Tarawa, November 1943 (10962042984) [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Marines_Wade_Ashore,_Tarawa,_November_1943_(10962042984).jpg

6. Wikimedia Commons contributors. (n.d.). NH 58424 Vice Admiral Charles A. Lockwood Jr., Portrait [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:NH_58424_Vice_Admiral_Charles_A._Lockwood_Jr.,_Portrait.jpg

7. Wikimedia Commons contributors. (n.d.). Raymond Ames Spruance Color, 1944 [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Raymond_Ames_Spruance_Color_1944.jpg

8. Wikimedia Commons contributors. (n.d.). SBD-3 Dauntless bombers of VS-8 over the burning Japanese cruiser Mikuma on 6 June 1942 [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:SBD-3_Dauntless_bombers_of_VS-8_over_the_burning_Japanese_cruiser_Mikuma_on_6_June_1942.jpg

9. Wikimedia Commons contributors. (n.d.). Submarines at Midway Atoll base in May 1945 [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Submarines_at_Midway_Atoll_base_in_May_1945.jpg

10. Wikimedia Commons contributors. (n.d.). USS Ranger (CV-4) underway at sea during the later 1930s [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:USS_Ranger_(CV-4)_underway_at_sea_during_the_later_1930s.jpg

11. Wikimedia Commons contributors. (n.d.). USS Yorktown during the Battle of Midway (34966921235) [Photograph]. Wikimedia Commons. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:USS_Yorktown_during_the_Battle_of_Midway_(34966921235).jpg