The United States Retakes Wake Island in 1943
- EA Baker
- Jul 29
- 8 min read
The fall of Wake Island was lionized as ‘The Alamo of the Pacific.’ The stalwart Marine defenders held their own valiantly against the landing forces of the Empire of Japan, repelling the first wave as reinforcements were on their way. A task force was sent by then-CINPAC Admiral William S. Pye, designated Task Force 14 and commanded by Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. It consisted of the aircraft carrier USS Saratoga, the fleet oiler USS Neches, the seaplane tender USS Tangier, three heavy cruisers, and eight destroyers. The task force carried the 4th Marine Defense Battalion and VMF-221 fighter squadron as reinforcements for the island. Yet, Pye decided that after the attack on Pearl Harbor, it was not worth risking the task force. So they turned around, dooming the defenders and their civilian contractors to Japanese occupation.
Wake Island would never be considered a strategic enough plot of land for the US Navy to retake. Instead, following the Island Hopping Doctrine, it would be left to wither on the vine. Rather than serve as he first island in the thrust toward Japan, it would be a remote outpost where the Japanese defenders would rot until war’s end. But one must wonder, especially in hindsight, after Operation Galvanic, the invasion of the Gilbert Islands (Tarawa and Makin Islands), if Wake Island would’ve been a feasible route through the Pacific.
In this blog, I’ll take a look at the fall of Wake Island and why it was bypassed. Then, I’ll explore what an invasion of Wake might’ve looked like and how it would’ve compared to Tarawa.
The Fall of Wake Island
The defense of Wake Island by U.S. forces was valiant but ultimately failed without reinforcements. It began on December 8 on the heels of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. The Empire of Japan launched air raids that precluded an invasion with 36 Mitsubishi G3M3 medium bombers based in the Marshall Islands. The attack destroyed 12 F4F Wildcats on the ground. The 4 remaining planes patrolled the skies, shooting down two bombers on the following day.
On December 11th, a Japanese task force comprising four light cruisers and six destroyers, a submarine tender, three submarines, two merchantmen, and two Momi-class destroyers that had been converted into patrol boats and configured to launch landing craft. Four hundred and fifty Special Naval Landing Force troops were committed to the assault.
The US personnel on the island included:
399 Marine infantry of the 1st Defense Battalion
50 Marines of VMF-211
68 US Navy personnel
5 US Army personnel
1,221 civilians
The US defenders of the island fought with:
6 × 5-inch (127 mm)/51 caliber naval guns (Originated from the old battleship Texas)
12 × 3-inch (76 mm)/50 caliber anti-aircraft guns (Only 1 had a working anti-aircraft director)
18 × .50-inch (12.7 mm) Browning heavy machine guns
30 × .30-inch (7.62 mm) machine guns (Mix of heavy, medium, and light; Included both water- and air-cooled models)
M1903 Springfield bolt-action rifles (firing .30-06; Marines had not yet switched to the M1 Garand)
Thompson submachine guns (.45 caliber)
.45 caliber pistols
Hand grenades
The Japanese first attempt to take the island was met with stiff resistance. The Americans were able to sink two destroyers (one with a coastal battery and another with an F4F Wildcat), as well as inflicting 407 casualties on the 450 Special Naval Landing Force troops. As we will see throughout the war, the Japanese would never let their honor be tarnished. While the Americans won the first engagement, the Japanese would return.
This time, the Japanese would send an overwhelming force to take the island, which included:
Second Carrier Division (Hiryu and Soryu)
8th Cruiser Division (Chikume and Tone)
17th Destroyer Division (Tanikaze, Urakaze)
6th Cruiser Division (Kinugasa, Aoba, Kako, Furutaka)
Destroyer Oboro, seaplane tender Kiyokawa Maru, transport/minelayer Tenyo Maru
29th Destroyer Division (Asanagi, Yunagi)
450-500 troops from the Maizuru Special Naval Landing Force
1,000 men from the Yokosuka 5th Special Naval Landing Force
500~ additional personnel for occupation (engineers, logistic personnel, etc.)
The second attack started on 23 December and lasted less than a day, roughly 12-15 hours. By midday, the US commander, Winfield S. Cunningham, having received word that the relief force had turned around, decided that he would surrender to avoid further loss of life. 1,611 Americans were captured.
Bypassing Wake Island
Once Wake Island fell, it served as a symbol of American defiance early in the war. Yet, it remained a backwater as the US Navy did not want to retake it. And there was a strong reason for leaving it to dwindle.
Once the Japanese took the island, they began to fortify and improve upon the existing defenses. Using the captured civilians, they added and enhanced the fortifications. The island was then garrisoned with the IJN 65th Guard Unit, which had roughly 2,000 men. The 13th Mixed Independent Regiment made up the rest of the garrison, composed of 1,939 men. With nearly 4,000 troops and better defenses, leadership felt it was not worth retaking.
Instead, Admiral Chester Nimitz, who took over for Pye, believed in a doctrine of Calculated Risk, which the island-hopping campaign represented. The idea was to bypass islands that were heavily defended and/or not strategically important. Wake Island did not fit the bill; instead, the Central Pacific Drive would start in the Gilbert Islands, with Tarawa and Makin Islands. The former would prove tougher than anyone expected. But what if the US had invaded Wake instead?
Recapturing Wake
In this scenario, I am assuming the Gilbert Islands are bypassed. With that in mind, the invasion force that was used for Tarawa and Makin would be available to invade Wake. The timing we can assume would be similar, given the lull of 1943 (there wasn’t a single carrier battle for good reason). Both navies needed time to recuperate after the heavy fighting of 1942. Therefore, a late 1943 invasion would remain a reasonable timeframe, given the much-needed new ships that were finally rolling off the production lines in the US (the Essex Class of aircraft carriers, for example).
Now, I would be curious if they would’ve taken the 27th Infantry Division, which was used to invade Makin Island. Given that the Battle of Wake Island in 1941 was a Marine fight, would politics come into play, leading to the Marine command’s insistence on this being a Marine-led fight? The 27th might’ve been left out, or instead used as a floating reserve or follow-on force. However, given how the Americans knew that Wake would be heavily fortified, the command might have very well used them in the invasion. I’ll keep them in the order of battle.
American Invasion Force-Fleet
17 aircraft carriers (6 fleet aircraft carriers, 5 light aircraft carriers, and 6 escort carriers)
12 battleships
8 heavy cruisers
4 light cruisers
66 destroyers
36 transport ships
American Invasion Force-Ground
2nd Marine Division (18,000)
27th Infantry Regiment (7,500)
Note, the number I’ve seen for Tarawa and Makin is 35,000, yet the breakdown is hard to find, given that the strength of the two divisions only adds up to 25,500. The best numbers I’ve found were 27,600 assault troops and 7,600 garrison troops.
Japanese Defense Force-Ground
IJN 65th Guard Force (2,000; unclear how many of are from the 2nd Battalion of the 170th Infantry Brigade which supplemented the 65th)
IJA 13th Independent Mixed Regiment (1,939)
Civilian Laborers (Mostly Korean-1,000+)
*I can’t find more information on possible other units stationed on Wake, including the 4th Naval Pioneer Battalion and parts of the 22nd and later the 24th Air Flotilla.
Now that the table is set, where would the US land?
Invasion Plan: Southern Shore (Like the Japanese in 1941)
Wake Island does not have many great beaches for landings. Technically, the island consists of three islets: Wake, Wilkes, and Peale. A coral reef surrounds the entire island, with its longest parts off the eastern shore of Wake and the northern shore of Peale. The lagoon would not be a feasible landing point because of the reef and the fact that the landing force could be shot at from three different sides.
Even though the southern shore was heavily fortified, it is the best place to land an invasion force (hence why it was so well defended). It has the longest stretches of beaches, shorter reefs offshore, and is close to the airfield. Airfields were always the target of island invasions throughout the Pacific War. Moreover, the US rarely split a landing force when invading an island. This makes me think the southern shore would be the most likely spot for the invasion force to land.
With these considerations in mind, I envision three beaches. Red 1 would run just from the west of Peacock Point to Runway B; Red 2 would run from Runway B to Runway A; and Red 3 from Runway A toward Wilkes Channel. Like on Tarawa, the 2nd Marine Division would land on these three beaches. I could envision military leadership adding a fourth beach, utilizing the 27th Infantry Regiment to secure Wilkes Island and protect the flank of the other beaches. We’ll call this Yellow Beach.
A prenaval bombardment with air strikes on key defensive positions would begin eight to twelve hours before H-Hour. Defenses across the entire three islets would be hit to keep the Japanese guessing where the US would attempt to land. No doubt, a gunnery battle with the coastal batteries on the island would ensue, and those would be targeted heavily, potentially diminishing attacks against other defensive positions. This would prove crucial, as it could mean a shortened bombardment (the fleet did not want to expend all its ammunition at Tarawa, fearing a naval battle at sea if the Japanese counterattacked; one would assume this concern would also occur here). A shorter bombardment would not bode well for the landing forces.
Troops would lead the American assault force in LVTs (AMTRACs), which could navigate over the fringing reefs if necessary. Given Wake’s geographic location, it’s likely that the tides would have been more predictable, too, thereby avoiding the Higgins boats getting stuck on the reefs and forcing the assaulters to wade ashore like on Tarawa. But that doesn’t mean the going would’ve been easy.
How an Invasion Would Potentially Play Out
In one word, bloody. While the defenses were not as compact as they were on Tarawa, they would still be formidable despite being more spread out. Moreover, Wake and its islets are a larger area to take over, potentially leading to a more drawn-out battle.
For this, I asked ChatGPT to compare the two and what the casualties could’ve looked like:
Metric | Tarawa | Wake Island (Hypothetical) |
Duration | 3.25 Days | 6-7 Days |
U.S. KIA | 1,000 | 1,200-1,800 |
U.S. Wounded | 2,100 | 2,500-3,000 |
Total U.S. Casualties | 3,100 | 4,000-4,800 |
Japanese Defenders | 4,800 | 4,400 |
Japanese KIA | 4,600 | 4,300-4,400 |
*These numbers are all approximations.
Conclusion
Retaking Wake Island instead of going to the Gilberts would’ve been more costly. However, while the casualties would’ve shocked the American public as Tarawa had, the propaganda factor around retaking ‘The Alamo in the Pacific’ and ‘avenging’ the slain US defenders and POWs would’ve provided some justification for the costliness of the island. Americans couldn’t fathom why so many lives were expended for Tarawa. The propaganda machine would’ve taken advantage to try to convince the public that Wake was worth it.
However, the distance from Wake Island to the Marshall Islands (the next stop on the island-hopping campaign) was much further when compared to the Gilberts. And Wake would not prove useful strategically, even with upgrades to its infrastructure. In sum, Nimitz was right (as he usually was) in going to the Gilberts. While a symbol of defiance early in the war, Wake Island, for the reasons outlined, did not offer any strategic advantage in retaking. It was simply too isolated and far away from everything to be of any use. Thus, it was best to leave it to wither on the vine.
Sources
Images
Comments