What-if: The Continental Army Loses At Saratoga

EA Baker
Oct 16
11 min read

In the fall of 1777, the American Revolution was in a precarious place. The British had firmly seized the initiative and were trying to split the colonies into two with a daring campaign. At the same time, the revolutionary capital, Philadelphia, had fallen. The cause was on a knife-edge. But things were not as they appeared.

General William Howe, Commander-in-Chief of British forces in America, had diverted from the original plan to seize Philadelphia, a move that was more symbolic than strategic. Bereveted Brigadier General Barry St. Leger’s mixed force of British regulars, Hessians, Indians, Canadiens, and Loyalists failed in their attack from the west at Fort Stanix. And General John Burgoyne, after winning the battle of Ticonderoga and Freeman’s Farm, surrendered after the Battles of Saratoga.

This defeat would prove a turning point in the American Revolution, garnering the invaluable support of the French for the American cause. But what if the Continental Army had lost at Saratoga? What would that have meant for the American Revolutionary cause? And with Howe taking Philadelphia and St. Leger’s retreat, what would Burgoyne do if he had won at Saratoga?

In this scenario, we explore how a Continental defeat might have reshaped strategy, influenced leadership decisions, and tested the limits of both armies under the harsh realities of late-18th-century warfare.

Context: Why The Saratoga Campaign?

A man in a red military coat stands confidently, holding a sword. Dark, stormy clouds form the backdrop, adding a dramatic mood. — Portrait of John Burgoyne by Joshua Reynolds, c. 1766.

General John Burgoyne, a career officer with a reputation for discipline and engineering skill, devised a bold plan in 1777: a three-pronged advance south from Canada to seize Albany and split New England from the other colonies. The campaign involved complex coordination between multiple forces moving through dense forests and along river valleys, a logistical nightmare even for a competent commander.

Historically, the campaign saw fierce engagements at Fort Ticonderoga, Hubbardton, Bennington, Freeman’s Farm, and Bemis Heights. American forces, leveraging interior lines and intimate knowledge of the terrain, managed to slow and ultimately encircle Burgoyne’s army, forcing his surrender in October.

Despite his shortcomings, the other two prongs of the attack had already fallen apart. Howe had decided rather controversially not to move north from New York as planned but to move to Philadelphia, thinking that taking the capital of the revolution would destroy American morale and help end the war. And St. Leger met stiffer resistance than expected on his campaign from the west. With news of Benedict Arnold marching with an American relief force, he lost his Indian allies. He was forced to retreat.

Map showing routes of Burgoyne, St. Leger, and Howe from Quebec, Montreal, and New York. Highlights Oriskany Battlefield and major lakes. — Original British plan for the Saratoga Campaign.

That left Burgoyne on his own. Though he had achieved successes in battles leading up to his surrender at Saratoga, his logistics were already stretched to their max. However, if he had won at Saratoga, despite his supply situation, I don’t think he would have turned around. While he had word from Howe that he was moving on Philadelphia, he did not know that St. Leger had been turned around. If he had won at Saratoga, I believe he would have pressed on with the attack for three reasons.

First, it was his plan. While he was overconfident initially and began to realize the difficulties of his campaign, a success at Saratoga with Albany so close in his sights, probably would’ve made him think a decisive victory was near.

Second, he did not have a good relationship with General Howe. After the Commander-in-Chief basically abandoned him, I can only imagine how sweet it would feel to Burgoyne to take Albany as planned without the help of Howe, though this is just speculation.

Lastly, Burgoyne’s personality as a commander provides some insight. He was disciplined, courageous, and an excellent logistician, but also rigid, overconfident, and often blind to poor intelligence. His adherence to textbook European tactics sometimes left him lacking the adaptability required in the war he was fighting. This would prove crucial in our scenario.

Strategic Implications of a Continental Loss at Saratoga

Had Burgoyne prevailed at Saratoga, the immediate consequences would have been stark:

French support for the revolution might have been delayed or diminished, depriving the Americans of critical resources and naval assistance.
The British would have been one step closer to consolidating control of the Hudson Valley, securing a vital corridor, and threatening the heart of New England.
American morale would’ve reached a new low, potentially impacting support for the cause.

Map showing Burgoyne's 1777 expedition routes in northeastern North America with key battles, locations, and dates in red text boxes. — Map of General Burgoyne's campaign and that of Barry St. Leger from the map collection, history department, U.S. Military Academy, West Point.

Yet even a setback at Saratoga would not have ended the war. The Continental Army would have regrouped south of Bemis Heights, preparing a defensive stand near Albany, using the confluence of the Hudson and Mohawk rivers as a natural defensive barrier. There were not many places from a terrain perspective they could make a stand, which makes me believe that if they did not want to cede Albany to the British, they would’ve used the rivers as part of their main defense. This would’ve required delaying actions down the road to Albany to buy time for a firmer stand that would break Burgoyne’s advance. This brings us to the hypothetical engagement I have called The Battle of Confluence.

The Hypothetical Battle of the Confluence

The Continentals chose Bemis Heights for a reason. It was a perfect place to lay a defensive position, acting as a natural checkpoint beside the Albany Road and overlooking the Hudson. If Burgoyne had outflanked the American position (which Benedict Arnold defeated in our timeline), he might have been able to dislodge the Americans from the heights. But the affair would’ve been costly.

Soldiers in 18th-century uniforms battle with bayonets; chaos and tension fill the scene. Text: Battle of Saratoga, Gen. Arnold wounded. — Battle of Saratoga: Gen. Arnold wounded in the attack on the Hessian Redoubt.

If he had won the ground, he probably would not have been able to move on to Albany quickly. This would give the Continentals time to regroup and build another defensive line north of Albany. There were not many great terrain features like Bemis Heights heading south toward Albany. The only natural barrier they could’ve used would’ve been the confluence of the Mohawk and Hudson rivers. But building up defenses would take time, and although Burgoyne may delay in moving to recover after the Battle of Bemis Heights, the Continentals had plenty of places they could make delaying actions.

A man in military attire with gold epaulettes holds a document and sword. He wears a medal. Dark, smoky background with subtle color touches. — Portrait of Horatio Gates c. 1794 by Gilbert Stuart, on display at the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

There are two settlements along the Hudson where potential delaying actions could occur to slow down Burgoyne’s advance. The first, Stillwater, just south of Bemis Heights, is where the American General Horatio Gates, commander of the army, had made his camp before the Battle of Freeman’s Farm and Bemis Heights with some incomplete entrenchments. Regrouping there, they could delay Burgoyne, using what defenses they had constructed as well as the Schuylers Supply Depot, a fortified blockhouse in Stillwater that was the site of two previous forts built up for Queen Anne’s War and the French and Indian War (Fort Ingoldsby and Fort Winslow).

The second settlement is just down the road at Mechanicville (the hometown of the first Union officer killed in the American Civil War, Elmer E. Elsworth). The town had a vital ferry crossing that the Continentals would most likely destroy to prevent its use by Burgoyne and his army. Assuming that the Continentals could not break or stop Burgoyne’s advance at these locations, and they merely engaged in delaying actions, the best defensive position to make a stand would’ve been where the Mohawk met the Hudson at Watford (on the northern bank of the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers), the islands of Peeble and Van Schaiuk (the latter was already known to the Americans as it had served as a headquarters and camp what was developed as part of a military road coming up from Albany), and Cohoes (on the west bank where the Mohawk flows into the Hudson.

American Defensive Preparations

Waterford would not have been the best place to make a hard stand, given that it was at the southern point of a peninsula, which would put the Americans back against the rivers with no quick way to retreat if necessary. A small force that could harry or even bait the British could be placed here, but Burgoyne would probably know the risk to his rear if he moved his army down this way.

The American defenses would center on Cohoes, with forces on the Peebles and Van Schaick Islands to prevent any British boats from moving down the river. They would have to put a picket or scout force on the east bank of the Hudson as well as along the Mohawk River to the west to prevent any chance of Burgoyne trying a flanking maneuver. In any case, Burgoyne would have to cross a river to move on to Albany. American defenses, militia, and their Orienda allies would make this quite difficult for him.

Burgoyne could move his army to the east bank and bypass these defenses. But that would mean he would have to cross the Hudson again to get back on the western side to take Albany. This would take time, enabling the Contientals to discover his actions and react. This is probably the least likely thing to happen, but it is possible in some fashion.

Battle scene with soldiers engaged in combat, smoke from cannons, and tents in the background. Text in German below depicts historical context. — Battle of Saratoga (September 19, 1777).

The other option would be a more direct assault across the islands from Waterford to Cohoes. This would be a difficult maneuver as the crossing would be under fire. Given the state of his army, Burgoyne may find this too difficult and instead opt for the most likely third option.

Expecting reinforcements from the east, and recognizing the threat to his flank by moving down to Waterford, Burgoyne may decide to hold in place as he scouted the northern banks of the Mohawk for a place to ford or ferry across to outflank the Americans. There was a rope ferry along the Mohawk where Henry Knox had crossed with captured cannons from Fort Ticonderoga in the previous year. The Continentals could use this to send a force around the toe flank of Burgoyne as he moved down toward Waterford, or conversely by Burgoyne to outflank the Continentals. If the latter became a potential reality, the Contientals would most likely destroy the ferry. This would leave Burgoyne with his boat bridge that he would need to move down, yet it would be under fire. But Burgoyne would have to contend with another enemy—weather.

Weather and Its Impact

Mid-to-late October in the Hudson Valley, based on what we know at the end of the Saratoga campaign, was rainy. Historical accounts from the period, including Baroness Frederika von Riedesel’s memoirs, describe “torrential rain” that left soldiers drenched and tents soaked, while U.S. Army reports note wet, cold, and difficult marching conditions. Daylight hours were short, mornings often foggy, and river crossings were swollen and treacherous.

For Burgoyne, these conditions would have compounded the difficulty of a flanking maneuver:

Muddy roads and riverbanks would slow infantry and artillery.
Swollen rivers could render fords impassable, forcing reliance on fragile pontoon bridges.
Fog and low light would impair coordination between columns.
Cold, damp conditions would sap morale and endurance, making prolonged operations costly.

In this environment, the defenders’ position was amplified: terrain, weather, and careful preparation could wear down Burgoyne and his army. Here’s how the three potential options I outlined above might have played out.

Option 1: Bypassing the American Lines to the East

The least likely, but perhaps the most imaginative, option was to swing the British army eastward, crossing to the opposite bank of the Hudson to bypass the American defenses entirely. The plan promised the lure of surprise; if he could outmaneuver Gates, Burgoyne might emerge south of Cohoes, threatening Albany from the east.

But the move would come at a terrible cost. To reach the east bank, his men would need to dismantle and ferry their artillery and supplies across the Hudson, only to cross back again to retake Albany on the opposite side. Each river crossing risked delay, confusion, and discovery. The Americans would quickly perceive his movement and could send detachments to block and hamper his crossing and march south.

Geography also compounded the problem: the eastern bank was marshy, broken, and crisscrossed by tributaries. The farther south he marched, the longer his supply lines stretched, and the more vulnerable his rear became to American raids. Even if he reached Albany, he would do so exhausted, with his army strung out over miles of hostile country. This bold maneuver would most likely fail, leaving his army crippled and forced into a retreat if not surrender.

Option 2: A Direct Assault Across to the Islands and Cohoes

The most straightforward—and most dangerous—plan was to force the crossing head-on, storming the Peebles and Van Schaick Islands before smashing through to Cohoes. He would begin with a massive artillery bombardment from the north bank at Waterford, softening the American entrenchments while Hessian engineers worked to deploy pontoon bridges under fire. Redcoats and Loyalist auxiliaries would form the first wave, pushing across the causeways under musket and grapeshot.

The Americans, however, had prepared for this. Gates’s guns commanded the river crossings, and riflemen from Morgan’s corps swept the banks with deadly accuracy. As the British columns advanced, they would be met by sheets of musket and artillery fire. Flooded lowlands and the wet weather would make the advance that much more difficult.

By midday, if they successfully crossed, the assault would probably stall and then collapse. In desperation, Burgoyne orders a withdrawal, leaving hundreds dead in the shallows of the Hudson. It would be his last offensive. The next day, American forces could counterattack from Burgoyne’s western flank, driving the remnants of Burgoyne’s army northward. Surrounded and starving, he may be forced to surrender outside Waterford or back up toward Stillwater.

Option 3: Seeking a Crossing on the Mohawk to the West

The third and most reasonable choice was to hold his current ground across from the American positions, shelling them with his artillery as he scouted for a northern crossing along the Mohawk River to outflank them. There, an old rope ferry near Halfmoon offered a potential route to move his army around Gates’s defenses.

It was a cautious plan, suited to his dwindling resources. A detachment could cross at night, establish a bridgehead, and threaten the American rear at Cohoes. But the Americans would most likely anticipate this. Gates would station some sort of scout force, comprised of light infantry, militia, and or Onieda along the wooded ridges west of the Mohawk, ready to ambush any crossing attempt.

The battle would feature days of fog and rain that cloaked the valley. Skirmishes would break out in the trees as British and American scouts clashed, each probing for weakness. After being harried and worn down, Burgoyne may opt for a desperate attempt to cross, which would most likely end in defeat. Given his supply situation and his wounds in the fighting to cross the river, he would most likely pursue a surrender.

Strategic and Narrative Consequences

A successful American defense at the confluence would have preserved the Continental Army, even after a theoretical loss at Saratoga. Morale would remain shaken but reinforced by a high-stakes defensive stand. French observers, seeing the Americans' resilience, might still have entered the war, albeit more cautiously. Burgoyne’s reputation would be severely damaged, and British operational plans in the northern theater would stall, buying the revolutionaries critical time.

A Continental loss at Saratoga would not have ended the Revolution, but it would have set the stage for a later British defeat. The outcome of such a battle would have depended on terrain, weather, and the command decisions of both sides, but in my mind, given Burgoyne’s situation and what he faced moving south, I don’t think he would have been able to take Albany without reinforcements and supply replenishment. And since those were never going to come, his campaign, despite his success, was doomed to fail.

Sources:

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